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ARGUMENT 
I 
DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT BE 
ALLOWED TO FORUM SHOP 
In his brief, Robert Crump ("Robert"), states that he 
mistakenly assumed that he had to file his Petition to Modify in 
Utah because Utah has become the children's home state. Robert 
further contends that there is no information indicating that he 
voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the State. 
Carolyn Crump Forsgren ("Carolyn") contends that Robert's argument 
is an argument of convenience with no sound basis or rationale. 
It is very evident that Robert came to Utah because the Court 
in Montana had not given him a favorable decision in the first 
instance. Even at the time of the divorce, the children stated 
1 
they wanted to remain in Montana. Robert knew that there: had been 
no significant change in circumstances for the Montana Court to 
change its previous decision and award him sole custody. Robert 
made a calculated decision to bring his action to Utah in the hope 
that the Utah Court would not be familiar with the prior 
proceedings and would grant him sole custody. 
Also, by filing an authenticated copy of the Montana Decree 
and requesting the Utah Court to invoke its power and authority, 
Robert has most definitely submitted himself to the jurisdiction of 
the Utah Court. Robert was not simply asking Utah to grant the 
Montana Decree full faith and credit
 f he was asking Utah to assume 
jurisdiction over the parties, including himself, and the Decree in 
order to modify the Decree, hopefully in his favor. When that 
failed, Robert further requested the Utah Court of Appeals to 
overlook Judge Low's decision and still grant him custody. 
In every sense of the word, Robert has submitted himself to 
the jurisdiction of the Courts in our State. 
II 
UTAH SHOULD EXERCISE ITS CONCURRENT JURISDICTION 
The primary contention of the majority opinion in holding that 
Utah does not have jurisdiction is that the PKPA does not allow 
concurrent jurisdiction. The majority claimed that there was no 
such thing as concurrent jurisdiction. Judge Russon, in his 
dissent, argued that concurrent jurisdiction did exist and that it 
2 
was up to the Court to determine whether the jurisdiction it had 
should be exercised. 
In the recent case of Holm v. Smilowitz, 196 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 
(Utah App. September 25, 1992), a copy of which is included in the 
Appendix, Judge Russon has apparently been able to convince two 
other Judges of the Court of Appeals to agree that there is 
concurrent jurisdiction. Both Judge Orme and Judge Billings 
concurred in Judge Russon's opinion wherein he again outlined his 
argument for concurrent jurisdiction pursuant to the UCCJA. 
Since there is concurrent jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals 
decision should be set aside, or at least allow the trial court to 
make a determination of whether Utah's jurisdiction should be 
exercised. 
Ill 
THE CASE AT BAR IS DISTINGUISHABLE 
FROM ALL CASES CITED BY DEFENDANT 
AND THE MAJORITY OPINION 
Robert claims that the opinion in State in the Interest of 
D.S.K., 792 P.2d 118 (Utah App. 1990), was issued the day after the 
hearing in the case at bar began. He suggests, therefore, that had 
that decision been issued earlier, he would have realized that 
jurisdiction was not proper in Utah. However, in State in the 
Interest of D.S.K., and all other cases Carolyn is aware of, the 
parties were contesting jurisdiction at the trial court level and 
the issue brought to the appeals court was whether jurisdiction 
existed. Also, in each of those cases, the party which had moved 
3 
from the decree state was attempting to modify or seek other relief 
contrary to the original Decree. 
The facts which distinguish this case from all other cases 
relied upon by Robert are that (1) Robert voluntarily came into 
Utah, (2) Robert voluntarily asked our courts to modify the Montana 
Decree, and (3) at no time was jurisdiction disputed. Certainly, 
neither the UCCJA nor the PKPA were intended to prevent a person 
from voluntarily asking the Court of another state to modify an 
original decree as long as the other state had jurisdiction to do 
so and all parties agree to the jurisdiction of the Court. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals cannot be 
sustained. Utah has jurisdiction over this matter and was 
requested by Defendant to exercise its jurisdiction and did 
exercise its jurisdiction. Simply because Defendant now wants 
another chance by asking the Montana Court to consider custody, 
which Defendant has already done by filing an action in Montana, 
that is no justification for this Court to uphold the hyper-
technical interpretation of the Court of Appeals of the PKPA and 
UCCJA. 
DATED this ' I day of November, 1992. 
Cf^L.^ 
SJteph&nfN. Jewe 11 
Atjfe^rn^y for 
(^a i -p t i f f /Pe t i t ioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify four (4) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT, were mailed, postage pre-paid, 
this [j day of November, 1992, to Robert A. Echard, Attorney for 
Defendant/Respondent, at 635 - 25th Street, Ogden, Utah 84401. 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Margaret HOLM, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Michael SMILOWITZ, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 910594-CA 
FILED: September 25, 1992 
Fifth District, Iron County 
The Honorable J. Philip Eves 
ATTORNEYS: 
Ellen Maycock, Salt Lake City, and Hans Q. 
Chamberlain, Cedar City, for Appellant 
Keith F. Oehler, Cedar City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Orme, and Russon. 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
RUSSON, Judge: 
Margaret Holm appeals the district court's 
denial of her motion for relief from judgment, 
filed pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of 
1 Civil Procedure. We reverse and remand. 
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FACTS 
Michael Smilowitz and Margaret Holm were 
divorced in Ohio on July 27, 1989. Holm was 
awarded custody of the parties1 sixteen 
month-old daughter. The following year, Holm 
filed a motion to modify the visitation provisions 
of the divorce decree, and Smilowitz filed a 
motion to change custody. Smilowitz moved to 
Florida, and Holm, with the parties' child, 
moved to Utah. On June 21, 1991, both parties 
attended a hearing on their pending motions in 
Ohio. At that hearing, the Ohio court discovered 
procedural defects in the parties' motions, 
namely that neither party had properly served 
the other, and ordered the parties to refile their 
motions. They were informed that they would 
receive written notice of the new hearing date, 
set for August 19. On June 27, Smilowitz reriled 
his petition, but did not serve Holm with the 
same until August 21. Holm never received 
written notice of the new hearing date from the 
Ohio court. 
Meanwhile, on July 8, 1991, Holm filed the 
Ohio divorce decree in Utah, pursuant to the 
Utah Foreign Judgment Act, along with a 
motion for Utah to assume jurisdiction under the 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 
(UCCJA) and a petition to modify the divorce 
decree as to visitation. She contended that Utah 
had "significant connections with" and was now 
the child's Mhome state" under that act. On 
August 8, Holm's motion was heard by 
Domestic Relations Commissioner Marlynn 
Lema, who took the matter under advisement. 
A deposition, which had been scheduled in 
Ohio in early August 1991, was cancelled 
because Holm had not yet been served with 
Smilowitz's latest petition. According to Holm's 
affidavit, Smilowitz's attorney then informed 
Holm's Ohio attorney that since Holm had not 
been served, the August hearing would not 
proceed as scheduled. On August 14, 1991, 
Holm's Utah attorney wrote a letter to the Ohio 
court, in which he informed the court that (1) 
Holm presently had a pending motion for Utah 
to assume jurisdiction pursuant to the "best 
interests" and "home state" provisions of the 
UCCJA, (2) Ohio was an "inconvenient forum" 
under the UCCJA since neither party nor the 
child resided there, (3) the same procedural 
problems that caused the June 21 hearing to be 
postponed still existed, and (4) Holm would not 
appear in Ohio until she had been properly 
served with Smilowitz's new petition and 
received notice from the court that the hearing 
would proceed as scheduled. On August 19, 
1991, in spite of Holm's absence, the Ohio court 
held the hearing, ruled that it had jurisdiction, 
awarded Smilowitz custody of the parties' child, 
and issued an order to that effect. 
On August 22, 1991, Smilowitz, accompanied 
by the Cedar City, Utah police, arrived at 
Holm's Utah residence with the recently issued 
Ohio order and demanded that he be given the 
child pursuant to the Ohio order. This Ohio 
order had not been domesticated in Utah. Holm 
contacted her Utah attorney, Hans Chamberlain, 
who told the police to see either Judge Eves, in 
whose court Holm had filed her motions, or his 
commissioner, Marlynn Lema. The police 
informed Chamberlain that the matter would be 
heard by Judge Eves the next morning. 
However, later that evening, Commissioner 
Lema called Chamberlain and informed him that 
she was denying Holm's motion for Utah to 
assume jurisdiction. Chamberlain requested a 
hearing from her on the Ohio order. The request 
was denied. Commissioner Lema then called a 
second time that evening and informed 
Chamberlain that she had talked to Judge Eves, 
and based on their conversation, it was her order 
that the Ohio order be enforced that very night. 
She then called the police, and without ever 
having seen the Ohio order, or the order ever 
having been filed in Utah, told them to enforce 
it. At 11:40 p.m., the police physically removed 
the child, screaming and vomiting, from her 
mother, and Smilowitz left the state with the 
child, now three and a half years old. 
Holm subsequently filed a motion for relief on 
the grounds that (1) Smilowitz had never 
domesticated the Ohio order in Utah, and (2) 
Holm was denied her right to contest the 
jurisdiction of the Ohio court. At a hearing held 
on September4, 1991, Judge Eves stated that he 
had only told Lema that he agreed with her as to 
Utah's lack of jurisdiction, and that since Utah 
did not have jurisdiction, he couldn't interfere 
with the Ohio order.1 On September 8, Judge 
Eves, by written order, denied Holm's motion 
for relief, holding that: (1) Ohio had original 
and continuing jurisdiction; (2) Utah declined 
jurisdiction after consultation with the Ohio 
court; (3) since the Ohio order was never filed 
in Utah, there was no order from which Holm 
was entitled to relief; and (4) Utah had no 
jurisdiction to enforce or prevent enforcement of 
the Ohio order. 
Holm appeals the Utah district court's order 
denying her motion for relief from the Utah 
order enforcing the undomesticated Ohio child 
custody order. This appeal concerns the 
following errors by the district court: (1) 
concluding that it did not have jurisdiction in 
this matter; (2) enforcing the Ohio change of 
custody order that had not been filed in Utah, 
instead of the original Ohio divorce decree 
which had been so filed; (3) refusing Holm a 
hearing before enforcing the Ohio change of 
custody order; and (4) permitting Commissioner 
Lema to perform nondelegable judicial acts. 
Smilowitz seeks sanctions for a frivolous appeal. 
ANALYSIS 
Standard of Review 
As a general rule, we will only reverse a 
denial of a motion to vacate an order or 
judgment under Rule 60(b) upon a showing of 
abuse of discretion by the trial court. State v. 
Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989). 
However, when the denial of such a motion 
rests ou an underlying jurisdictional 
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determination,' as ii does here, it "becomes a 
question of law upon which we do not defer to 
the district court." Id. 
Jurisdiction under the UCCJA 
As an initial matter, we address the district 
court's erroneous conclusion that it did not have 
jurisdiction in this case. The UCCJA, which has 
now been adopted in all fifty states and the 
District of Columbia, specifically recognizes that 
two states may have simultaneous concurrent 
jurisdiction, but only one state may exercise it. 
The purpose of the act, codified in Utah at Utah 
Code Ann. §§78-45c-l to -26 (1992), is to direct 
when such jurisdiction shall be exercised. Utah 
Code Ann. §78-45c-3 (1992) states: 
(1) A court of this state which is 
competent to decide child custody matters 
has jurisdiction to make a child custody 
determination by initial or modification 
decree if the conditions as set forth in any 
of the following paragraphs are met: 
(a) this state: 
(i) is the home state of the child at the 
time of commencement of the 
proceeding; or 
(ii) had been the child's home state 
w i t h i n s i x m o n t h s b e f o r e 
commencement of the proceeding and 
the child is absent from this state 
because of his removal or retention by 
a person claiming his custody or for 
other reasons, and a parent or person 
acting as parent continues to live in this 
state; 
(b) it is in the best interest of the 
child that a court of this state assume 
jurisdiction because: 
(i) the child and his parents, or the 
child and at least one contestant, have a 
significant connection with this state; 
and 
(ii) there is available in this state 
substantial evidence concerning the 
child's present or future care, 
protection, training, and personal 
relationships; 
(c) the child is physically present in 
this state or this state is the most recent 
domicile of the mother prior to the birth 
of the child, and: 
(i) the child has been abandoned; or 
(ii) it is necessary in an emergency to 
protect the child because he has been 
subjected to or threatened with 
mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise 
neglected or dependent; or 
(d) (i) it appears that no other state 
would have jurisdiction under 
prerequisites substantially in accordance 
with Subsections (a), (b), or (c), or 
another state has declined to exercise 
jurisdiction on the ground that this state 
is the more appropriate forum to 
determine the custody of the child; and 
(ii) it is in the best interest of the 
child that this court assume jurisdiction. 
Thus, State Two clearly has jurisdiction if it 
meets one of the bases established in that 
section, regardless of the fact that another state 
may also have jurisdiction. 
Other sections of the UCCJA also indicate 
concurrent jurisdiction wherein they require that 
State Two shall stay proceedings if the matter is 
pending in another state, Utah Code Ann. 
§78-45c-6(3) (1992); or may decline to exercise 
its jurisdiction if the first state is a more 
appropriate forum, Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-7 
(1992); or may decline to exercise its 
jurisdiction if the petitioner is guilty of improper 
conduct, Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-8(l) (1992); 
and shall not exercise its jurisdiction to modify 
unless the interest of the child necessitates, Utah 
Code Ann. §78-45c-8(2) (1992). 
Utah case law also illustrates the existence of 
concurrent jurisdiction. In Coppedge v. Harding, 
714 P.2d 1121 (Utah 1985), an action was filed 
by the Coppedges in Oregon, to make them 
guardians of their grandson, who was living 
with them in Oregon. In response, a custody 
action by the child's parents was subsequently 
filed in Utah. The Utah Supreme Court ordered 
the Utah district court "to stay the Utah action to 
the extent that it seeks to determine custody 
under the Uniform Act" and "to communicate 
with the Oregon Court . . . to determine the 
propriety of further proceedings in Oregon." Id. 
at 1122. The supreme court further instructed 
the district court that *|i|n the event that the 
Oregon court stays its proceedings after such 
communication, then the Utah court may 
proceed to adjudicate the custody matter." Id. If 
the Utah district court did not have jurisdiction, 
it would not have the power to stay its 
proceedings, nor the power to proceed after 
communicating with Oregon. On the other hand, 
if Oregon did not have jurisdiction, the Utah 
Supreme Court would have simply concluded 
such and ordered the district court to proceed. 
Therefore, it is clear that both states had 
jurisdiction. See also State in Interest ofW.D. v. 
Drake, 770 P.2d 1011, 1013 (Utah App. 1989) 
(under the facts of that case, Utah and California 
had concurrent jurisdiction); Rawlings v. 
Weiner, 752 P.2d 1327, 1331 (Utah App.) 
(Bench, J., concurring) (under the facts of that 
case, Utah had primary jurisdiction and 
Washington had secondary jurisdiction), cert, 
denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). 
Under the UCCJA and relevant case law, 
concurrent jurisdiction exists whenever a state 
satisfies one of the circumstances enumerated in 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-3 (1992). In the case 
at bar, Utah has jurisdiction since it is in the 
best interest of the child for Utah to assume 
jurisdiction because the child and at least one 
parent have a significant connection with Utah 
and there is substantive evidence in Utah 
pertaining to the child's care, protection, 
training and personal relationships. See Utah 
Code Ann. §78-45c-3(l)(b)(1992). Accordingly, 
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the district court erred when it concluded that it 
did not have jurisdiction in this matter.2 
However, just because the Utah court has 
jurisdiction does not mean that it can exercise it. 
Once the jurisdictional requirements of the 
UCCJA have been met, Utah Code Ann. 
§§78-45c-6, -7, and -14 (1992) must be 
examined to determine whether such jurisdiction 
can be exercised. Under section 14, State Two 
generally cannot modify the custody decree of 
State One unless it appears to the court of State 
Two that State One "does not now have 
jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites 
substantially in accordance with [the UCCJA| or 
has declined to assume jurisdiction!.|M Utah 
Code Ann. §78-45c-14(l)(a) (1992). 
Accordingly, if both parents and the children 
move from the state of the original decree, 
deference to that state's jurisdiction is no longer 
required. State in Interest ofD.S.K., 792 P.2d 
118, 124 (Utah App. 1990) (citing Bodcnheimer, 
Interstate Custody: Initial Jurisdiction and 
Continuing Jurisdiction under the UCCJA, 14 
Fam. L.Q. 203, 214-15 (1981)). The operation 
of section 14 was explained by the drafters of 
the UCCJA, the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, as 
follows: 
Courts which render a custody decree 
normally retain continuing jurisdiction to 
modify the decree under local law. Courts 
in other states have in the past often 
assumed jurisdiction to modify the 
out-of-state decree themselves without 
regard to the preexisting jurisdiction of the 
other state. See People ex rel. Halvey v. 
Halvey, 330 U.S. 610,67 S.Ct. 903 (1947). 
In order to achieve greater stability of 
custody arrangements and avoid forum 
shopping, subsection (a) declares that other 
states will defer to the continuing 
jurisdiction of the court of another state as 
long as that state has jurisdiction under the 
standards of the Act. In other words, all 
petitions for modification are to be 
addressed to the prior state if that state has 
sufficient contact with the case to satisfy 
section 3. The fact that the court had 
previously considered the case may be one 
factor favoring its continued jurisdiction. If, 
however, all the persons involved have 
moved away or the contact with the state 
has otherwise become slight, modification 
jurisdiction would shift elsewhere. Compare 
Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 
62 Mich. L. Rev. 795, 821-22 (1964). 
For example, if custody was awarded to 
the father in state 1 where he continued to 
live with the children for two years and 
thereafter his wife kept the children in state 
2 for 6-1/2 months (3-1/2 months beyond 
her visitation privileges) with or without 
permission of the husband, state I has 
preferred jurisdiction to modify the decree 
despite the fact that state 2 has in the 
meantime become the "home state" of the 
31 
child. If, however, the father also moved 
away from state 1, that state loses 
modification jurisdiction interstate, whether 
or not its jurisdiction continues under local 
law. See Clark, Domestic Relations 322-23 
(1968). 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 
Comment at 32 (1968) (hereinafter, Comment). 
Thus, in the case at bar, the district court had 
the duty to examine whether deference to Ohio 
was still required under the UCCJA. 
Additionally, Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-6 
(1992) provides that State Two "shall not 
exercise its jurisdiction . . . if at the time of 
filing the petition a proceeding concerning the 
custody of the child was pending in a court of 
another state exercising jurisdiction!.]" Utah 
Code Ann. §78-45c-6(l) (1992). In such case, 
State Two "shall stay the proceeding and 
communicate with the court in which the other 
proceeding is pending to the end that the issue 
may be litigated in the more appropriate 
forum(.|" Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-6(3) (1992). 
This is the option that the commissioner and the 
Utah district court apparently attempted to 
pursue here. However, rather than stay the 
action, the commissioner instead dismissed it 
outright, in contravention of section 78-45c-6(3). 
Given that the purposes of the UCCJA include 
determination of custody by the state which can 
best decide the case in the interest of the child, 
facilitating the enforcement of custody decrees 
of sister states, and promotion of cooperation 
and mutual assistance between states, see Utah 
Code Ann. §78-45c-l (1992), the Utah district 
court, at the very least, should have stayed its 
determination until after it held a hearing to 
determine whether jurisdiction should be 
exercised. We therefore conclude that the 
district court not only erred in determining that 
it had no jurisdiction, but also erred in refusing 
to hold a hearing to examine whether 
jurisdiction should be exercised. 
Enforcement of Ohio Modification Order 
The commissioner and the district court 
further erred in enforcing the Ohio order. 
Although it is clear that under the United States 
Constitution, another state's orders are entitled 
to full faith and credit in Utah, see U.S. Const 
art. IV, §1, it is equally clear that a foreign 
judgment must first be filed in Utah in order for 
it to become an enforceable Utah order, and 
furthermore, that the parties are, in most 
circumstances, entitled to a hearing on the 
foreign order to examine the narrow issue of 
whether the other state court had jurisdiction 
when it rendered its order. Neither occurred 
here, resulting in denial of Holm's substantive 
due process rights. 
Smilowitz argues that since Utah Code Ann. 
§78 45c-15 (1992) only provides that a certified 
copy of a custody decree may be filed with a 
district court clerk in Utah, the Utah Foreign 
Judgment Act does not apply to the decree here. 
We disagree. The National Conference of 
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Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
explained section 15 of the UCCJA as follows: 
Out-of-state custody decrees which are 
required to be recognized are enforced by 
other states. See section 13 |Utah Code 
Ann. §78-45c-13 (1992)|. Subsection (a) 
(Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-i5(a) (1992)1 
provides a simplified and speedy method of 
enforcement. It is derived from section 2 of 
the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments Act of 1964, 9A U.L.A. 486 
(1965). 
Comment at 33. Section 2 of the Uniform 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act of 1964 
is substantially similar to the Utah Foreign 
Judgment Act. Thus, enforcement of a foreign 
custody decree pursuant to the UCCJA must be 
accomplished in compliance with provisions of 
the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, which governs 
the procedure for enforcement of all foreign 
judgments. See, generally, Beck v. Smith, 296 
N.W.2d 886, 891 (N.D.~ 1980). This ruling is 
consistent with other states that have held that 
under the UCCJA, a certified copy of the 
foreign judgment must first be filed in the state 
before the state will recognize and enforce it. 
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Dagan, 103 Or. 
App. 453, 798 P. 2d 253, 255 (1990). 
Otherwise, nothing could prevent one divorced 
parent from suddenly appearing on the former 
spouse's doorstep with a foreign order in hand, 
demanding immediate change of custody without 
the custodial parent having an opportunity to be 
heard, or the foreign order tested for validity. 
An order of a judge in one state is simply not 
enforceable in another state until that order has 
been domesticated in the second state. 
Article IV, Section 1 of the United States 
Constitution provides: "Full Faith and Credit 
shall be given in each state to the public Acts, 
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other 
State." Created as a mechanism for enforcing 
this section, the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, 
defines a "foreign judgment" as "any judgment, 
decree, or order of a court of the United States 
or of any other court whose acts are entitled to 
full faith and credit in this state." Utah Code 
Ann. §78-22a-2(l) (1992). However, before the 
said judgment can be enforced in Utah, a party 
must first file it with a clerk of any district 
court. See Utah Code Ann. §78-22a-2(2) 
(1992).3 After such occurs, "(t|he clerk of the 
district court shall treat the foreign judgment in 
all respects as a judgment of a district court of 
Utah." Id. The Utah Supreme Court has stated 
that the purpose of this statute is to enable 
"foreign judgments to be treated as if they were 
local judgments once they have been filed with 
the clerk of a district court." Pan Energy v. 
Martin, 813 P.2d 1142, 1144 (Utah 1991) 
(emphasis added). 
Thus, under section 78-22a-2, both the 
original divorce decree that gave custody to 
Holm, and the Ohio order that changed custody 
to Smilowitz are foreign judgments. However, 
only the original divorce decree was enforceable 
in Utah since only it had been filed here. 
Thus, the Utah district court erred in 
enforcing the undomesticated Ohio order when 
it, in fact, was obligated to enforce the only 
document legally before it, the original Ohio 
divorce decree, which granted custody of the 
child to Holm. 
Holm's Due Process Rights 
Holm argues that the commissioner and the 
district court violated her due process rights by 
refusing her Utah attorney's request for a 
hearing on the undomesticated Ohio order. We 
agree. 
"The demands of due process rest on the 
concept of basic fairness of procedure and 
demand a procedure appropriate to the case and 
just to the parties involved." Wiscombe v. 
Wiscombe, 744 P.2d 1024, 1025 (Utah App. 
1987) (quoting Rupp v. Grantsville City, 610 
P.2d 338, 341 (Utah 1980)). "One of the 
fundamental requisites of due process is the 
opportunity to be fully heard." Id. (citation 
omitted). 
While the district court may have eventually 
declined to exercise jurisdiction under Utah 
Code Ann. §78-45c-6 (1992), it was error to do 
so without permitting Holm a hearing as to 
Ohio's jurisdiction in regard to its order 
changing custody. It is well settled that "|a| 
foreign judgment rendered without jurisdiction 
over the defendant or under circumstances which 
amount to a lack of due process is not entitled to 
full faith and credit in Utah." Data Management 
Sys.t Inc. v. EDP Corp., 709 P.2d 377, 379 
(Utah 1985); see also Paffel v. Paffel, 131 P.2d 
96, 99 (Utah 1986) (a foreign judgment entered 
without jurisdiction and proper service of 
process is void and need not be accorded full 
faith and credit). Only when the question of a 
sister state's jurisdiction is fully and fairly 
litigated in the foreign court, does such 
judgment have a res judicata effect on the matter 
of jurisdiction in Utah. See Data Management 
Sys.t Inc., 709 P.2d at 379; Paffel, 732 P.2d at 
99. 
In a case similar to ours, Wyatt v. Falhsing, 
396 So.2d 1069 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981), the 
Alabama Court of Civil Appeals held that the 
mother, who was living in Alabama, was denied 
her due process rights by the trial court's 
enforcement of a foreign modification judgment 
without giving the mother reasonable notice and 
opportunity to be heard. The court stated: 
A prompt hearing should be held as to 
whether the (UCCJAJ requires that the sister 
state's custody judgment be recognized and 
enforced. The party seeking to enforce the 
judgment of another state normally would 
meet their initial burden of proof at that 
limited hearing by the introduction into 
evidence of a properly authenticated copy of 
the judgment relied upon. At such hearing, 
the parent contesting the foreign judgment 
would have the right to specifically plead in 
defense thereto and to present evidence as to 
the nonexistence of the jurisdiction of the 
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sister state rendering the judgment. They 
could also plead and prove whether other 
just cause exists undei the Act for not 
recognizing the judgment such as those 
stated in Section 8 {Utah Code Ann. 
§78-45c-8 (1992)1; or whether the sister 
state's judgment was punitive; or whether 
there was a lack of notice of the sister 
state's proceedings as is required by Section 
4 [Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-4 (1992)). The 
above examples are not intended to be 
exclusive, for there may be other valid 
grounds of contest at that first hearing. 
. . . Should the trial court determine after 
such hearing that such a judgment must be 
recognized, the court would then enfoice the 
other state's judgment without further 
proceedings. 
If the local court decides that the Act does 
not authorize the recognition of the 
judgment, and if modification proceedings 
are then pending in the trial court, a further 
or additional hearing would be held to 
determine whether, in the trial court's 
judicial discretion, jurisdiction over such 
modification proceedings should then be 
exercised. 
Id. at 1073 (citations omitted). The Alabama 
court concluded that due to the lack of a hearing 
satisfying the requirements above, the wife's due 
process rights were violated. 
In the same way, Holm's due process rights 
were violated by the commissioner's decision to 
enforce the Ohio change of custody order 
without granting Holm the hearing that her 
attorney timely requested. In the case at bar, 
Holm received no notice from the Ohio court as 
to the hearing scheduled for August 19. 
Secondly, Holm was not served with 
Smilowitz's motion until August 21 , two days 
after the hearing was held in Ohio. Thirdly, 
based on these procedural defects, which had 
already led to the postponement of the June 21 
hearing, Holm's Utah attorney informed the 
Ohio court that Holm would not appear in Ohio 
until the same were remedied, which letter 
received no response. Fourthly, Smilowitz's 
Ohio counsel informed Holm's Ohio counsel that 
the August hearing would not proceed as 
planned. Under such circumstances, there was a 
valid issue whether the modification order was 
jurisdictionally valid in Ohio. Thus, in addition 
to enforcing an order that had not been filed in 
Utah, the commissioner erred in refusing Holm 
a hearing on the jurisdiction of the Ohio court 
before enforcement of that order. Since none 
was permitted, a violation of Holm's due 
process rights occurred. See id. 
Commissioner Exceeded Authority 
Lastly, Holm argues that the district court 
erred by permitting Commissioner Lema to 
perform non-delegable judicial acts. Numerous 
cases in Utah have held that the core functions 
of the various branches of government are 
nondelegable. See, e.g., State v. Galium, 572 
33 
P.2d 683, 687 (Utah 1977) (Article VI, Section 
1 of the Utah Constitution limits the legislature's 
ability to delegate legislative powers to others); 
In re Bridwell, 25 Utah 2d 1, 474 P.2d 116, 116 
(Utah 1970) (the Utah Supreme Court cannot 
delegate its duty to discipline an erring attorney 
to others); Stale v. Green, 793 P.2d 912, 916 
(Utah App. 1990) ("crime definition and penalty 
powers are essential legislative functions that 
cannot constitutionally be delegated by the Utah 
Legislature to any other person or body"). 
Hence, our inquiry focuses on whether ithe 
duties delegated here involved the core functions 
of the judiciary. 
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Ulah 
Constitution provides: 
The judicial power of the state shall be 
vested in a supreme court, in a trial court of 
general jurisdiction known as the district 
court, and in such other courts as the 
Legislature by statute may establish. 
The specific judicial powers of the district courts 
are set out in Article VIII, Section 5 of the Utah 
Constitution: 
The district court shall have original 
jurisdiction in all matters except as limited 
by this constitution or by statute{.] 
T h e term 'judicial power of courts' is 
generally understood to be the power to hear 
and determine controversies between adverse 
parties and questions in litigation." Timpanogos 
Planning and Water Management Agency v. 
Central Utah Water Conservancy Distr., 690 
P.2d 562, 569 (Utah 1984) (quoting Citizens' 
Club v. Welling, 83 Utah 81, 90, 27 P.2d 23, 
26 (1933)). Judicial power includes "the 
authority to hear and determine justiciable 
controversies," id. (quoting Galloway v. 
Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 422 P.2d 237, 242 
(1967)), and "to enforce any valid judgment, 
decree or order." Id. (quoting Galloway, 411 
P.2d at 242). Judicial power is that which us 
"necessary to protect the fundamental integrity 
of the judicial branch," In re Criminal 
Investigation, 7th Dist. Ct. No. CS-1, ISA P.2d 
633, 642 (Utah 1988), and "may not be wholly 
delegated to a nonjudicial officer." Id. 
Implicit in the vesting of judicial power in 
Article VIII judges is a prohibition against any 
attempt to vest such power elsewhere. Just as a 
legislator could not authorize someone else to sit 
in his or her place and vole on legislation, 
neither can a judge appoint another person to sit 
in his or her place and conduct trials, make final 
orders and judgments, or otherwise exercise 
ultimate judicial power. Such constitutional 
judicial powers cannot be delegated. Such 
judicial powers can be exercised only by those 
who have been appointed pursuant to the 
requirements and safeguards set forth in the 
Utah Constitution. 
This conclusion is further supported by an 
examination of the federal equivalent of 
commissioners, the magistrate system. In 1968., 
the United States Magistrates Act, 28 USCA 
§§631 et sea. (19681 w«« «««,-* «.*.:~i. 
allowed magistrates (formerly called 
commissioners) to perform certain duties in I 
assistance to federal judges, but within the strict 
limitations of Article III of the United States 
Constitution, which provides in pertinent part: 
The judicial power of the United States, 
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in 
such inferior Courts as the Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish. 
In considering the United States Magistrates 
Act, much concern centered on the possibility 
that the act might improperly delegate to 
magistrates duties reserved by the Constitution 
to Article 111 judges. Mathews v. Weber, 423 
U.S. 261, 269, 96 S. Ct. 549, 554 (1976). The 
act resolved this concern by providing that, in 
all cases, the district court judge remains 
ultimately responsible. The magistrate acts under 
the direct supervision of the district judges, id., \ 
423 U.S. at 270, 96 S. Ct. at 554, and \ 
"authority for making final decisions remains at 
all times with the district judge." Id. (citation 
omitted); accord United States v. Whitmire% 595 
F.2d 1303, 1305 (5th Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 
448 U.S. 906, 100 S. Ct. 3048 (1980); TPO, 
Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d 348, 359 (7th Cir. 
1972); see generally 28 USCA §636. Federal 
courts have consistently upheld limitations on 
magistrates' authority. For instance, in 
McMillen, the Seventh Circuit held that 
magistrates lack the power to decide motions to 
dismiss or motions for summary judgment 
because both involve ultimate decision making. 
McMillen, 460 F.2d at 359. Moreover, the court 
stated that district courts have no authority to 
abdicate their decision making responsibility and 
cannot delegate such duties to magistrates. Id. In 
Reed v. Bd. of Election Comm 'rs of City of 
Cambridge, 459 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1972), the 
First Circuit similarly held that to the extent that 
a magistrate's memorandum and order purported 
to be a decision on the merits, particularly a 
final decision, it was an abnegation of the 
district court's judicial authority and therefore 
improper. Id. at 123; see also Cason v. Owen, 
578 F.2d 572, 573 (5th Cir. 1978) f (Olnly a 
district judge can enter a final judgment in a 
civil case."); Cruz v. Hauck, 515 F.2d 322, 327 
(5th Cir. 1975) (magistrates are not empowered 
to hand down decisions in civil cases), cert, 
denied, 424 U.S. 917, 96 S. Ct. 1118 (1976). 
Thus, it is clear that the authority vested in 
federal judges under the United States 
Constitution, Article III, Section 1, can only be 
exercised by Article 111 judges and cannot be 
delegated.4 
Additionally, other states with commissioner 
systems reach the same conclusion. Numerous 
courts have stated that judicial power must be 
exercised by judges and cannot be delegated by 
the court to another body or person. See, e.g., 
Mount v. State, 45 Ala. App. 244, 228 So.2d 
857 (Ala. Crim. App. 1969); In re Santa Cruz, 
8 Ariz. App. 349, 446 P.2d 253 (1969); C.C.C. 
v. District Court for the Fourth Judicial Dist., 
m Colo, 437, 535 P,2d 1117 (197?); General 
Hill K)\V II7 C<xlc«Co 
Iv. Rep. 28 Provo. Utah 
Motors Corp. w Erves, 399 Mich. 241, 249 
N.W.2d 41 (1976); Lenis v. Texas Dept. of 
Pub. Safety, 407 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1966). The Wyoming Supreme Court has 
specifically stated that commissioners are mere 
adjuncts of the court and are not in any manner 
distinct from the court of which they are 
commissioners. Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, 
Inc., 519 P.2d 972, 977 (Wyo. 1974); accord 
State ex rel. Vwmpson v. Nash, 27 Wis.2d 183, 
133 N.W.2d 769, 775 (1965). That same court 
has more recently stated that "lt|he district court 
cannot delegate the power to hear, try, or 
determine a case to a court commissioner." K. C. 
v. State, 771 P.2d 774, 778 (Wyo. 1989). 
"Simply put, *fg|eneral court commissioner 
responsibilities as a hearing examiner cannot be 
outspread, absent expansion of constitutional 
authorization, to include power of decisional 
| finality within present constitutional terms. The 
differentiation is between adjunct fact finding 
and plenary judicial responsibility."" Id. (quoting 
Foster v. Foster, 768 P.2d 1038, 1042 (Wyo. 
1989) (Urbigkit, J., specially concurring)). 
Similarly, the Indiana Supreme Court has held 
that the state legislature cannot vest 
commissioners with judicial duties which only 
the courts can constitutionally exercise. State ex 
rel. Smith v. Starke Circuit Court, 417 N.E.2d 
1115, 1121-23 (Ind. 1981). "A master 
commissioner is not a court, and judicial duties 
I which courts only can exercise, can not be 
conferred upon him." Id. at 1121 (quoting 
Shoultz v. McPheeters 79 lnd. 373, 376 (1881)); 
I accord, Rodgers v. Rodgers, 503 N.E.2d 1255, 
1256-57 (Ind. App. 1987). Also, an Indiana 
I Court of Appeals noted that a commissioner 
I "acts as an instrumentality to inform and assist 
I the court; only the court has authority to make 
final orders or judgments." Breaziel v. State, 
568 N.E.2d 1072, 1073 (Ind. App. 1991) 
I (citation omitted). 
I However, this does not mean that 
I commissioners are without power to act within 
their limited authority. In the Federal system, 
magistrates are allowed to hear and determine, 
J among other things, particular pretrial matters, 
I to hold hearings and submit proposed findings of 
I fact and recommendations for disposition, and to 
I handle certain matters with the consent of the 
parties. See generally 28 USCA §636. 
Likewise, while Utah commissioners have no 
I authority to exercise ultimate judicial power, 
I they are authorized to exercise certain functions 
I to assist the judiciary in the exercise of its 
judicial power. The powers of commissioners at 
I all times material herein were set forth at Utah 
Code Ann. §78-3-31 (Supp. 1990) and in the 
Judicial Council Rules of Judicial 
Administration. Utah Code Ann. §78-3-31(9) 
(Supp. 1990) expressly provides that the rules 
governing commissioners shall establish the 
"types of orders commissioners may 
recommend," the "types of relief commissioners 
may recommend'," and provide a "procedure for 
1 timely judicial review of recommendations and 
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orders made by court commissioners," id. 
(emphasis added), and Rule 3-201(9) directly 
parallels that provision. Rule 6-401 grants 
commissioners the authority and duty to, among 
other things, conduct hearings with parties and 
their counsel, and to make recommendations to 
the parties and the court regarding any issue in 
domestic relations. These provisions are clearly 
constitutional, since ultimate decision making 
remains with the judge.5 
On the other hand, Utah Code Ann. 
§78-3-3 l(6)(a) (Supp. 1990) specifically states 
that court commissioners may not "make final 
orders except as otherwise provided by law," 
and Rule 3-201(9) similarly provides a specific 
"prohibition against commissioners issuing final 
orders except where otherwise permitted by 
law." Id. (emphasis added).6 Additionally, 
Subsection 6(A) of Rule 6-401 states that 
M(c|ommissioners shall not make final 
adjudications of domestic relations matters other 
than default or uncontested divorces and 
modifications."7 
In the case at bar, Commissioner Lema 
exceeded her authority by attempting to exercise 
ultimate judicial power in: (1) deciding Holm's 
motion for Utah to assume jurisdiction; (2) 
informing Holm's attorney that it was her order 
that the Ohio change of custody order be 
enforced that night; (3) ordering the police to 
enforce the uudomesticated Ohio order; and (4) 
denying Holm's attorney's request for a hearing 
before the court with regard to the 
undomesticated Ohio order. Such was done 
without authority, and in violation of 
constitutional principles, and thus, constituted an 
unconstitutional exercise of judicial power. 
In performing the acts enumerated above, 
Commissioner Lema not only exceeded the 
bounds of her authority as provided by the 
Judicial Counci l Rules of Judicial 
Administration, see Rule 6-401(6)(A), but she 
also assumed judicial power in violation of 
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution. 
Denying a motion for Utah to assume 
jurisdiction involves a final determination of a 
cause of action and is therefore clearly a judicial 
function. See, e.g., McMillen, 460 F.2d at 359; 
Breaziel, 568 N.E.2d at 1073. Such power must 
be exercised solely by a judge, not a 
commissioner. 
And such error could not be cured by 
ratification by Judge Eves. Judge Eves did not 
have the authority to delegate away his judicial 
power to an employee in the first place. K. C v. 
State, 111 P.2d at 778; accord Mount, 228 
So.2d at 858; In re Santa Cruz, 446 P.2d at 
255; C.C.C. v. District Court for the Fourth 
Judicial Dist., 535 P.2d at 1119; Erves, 249 
N.W.2d at 49; Lewis, 407 S.W.2d at 856; see 
generally McMillen, 460 F.2d at 359; Reed, 459 
F.2d at 121. Consequently, he could not 
subsequently ratify that employee's illegal 
judicial acts as his own. 
The reasons for the constitutional limitation of 
the exercise of judicial power to Article VIII 
judges is clear. Judges are selected and retained 
by a constitutional process which includes 
nomination by committee, appointment by the 
Governor, approval of the Utah Senate, and 
approval of the public by periodic retention 
elections. They are also subject to the Judicial 
Conduct Commission, which has the power of 
sanction by reprimand, censure, or removal. 
Utah Const, art. VIII, §13. The result of this 
process is broad public accountability. However, 
no such process is involved in the selection of 
commissioners, who are simply appointed by the 
Judicial Council with the approval of a majority 
of the district court judges in the district in 
which the commissioner will serve. See Utah 
Code Ann. §78-3-3 l(2)(a) (Supp 1990). 
Commissioners have no accountability to the 
public, but only to the judges for whom they 
work. The people have a right to have their 
cases and controversies ultimately decided by 
Article VIII judges who have been vested with 
judicial power by the constitution. Anything less 
is a clear violation of the Utah constitution and 
Utah law.* 
Sanctions 
Lastly, Smilowitz seeks sanctions against 
Holm for a frivolous appeal, pursuant to Rule 
33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. A 
frivolous appeal is "Jojne in which no justiciable 
question has been presented and . . . is readily 
recognizable as devoid of merit in that there is 
little prospect that it can ever succeed." Farrel 
v. Porter, 830 P.2d 299, 302 (Utah App. 1992) 
(quoting Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 416 
(Utah 1990)). Since the outcome of our opinion 
indicates that Holm's appeal was meritorious, 
we deny Smilowitz's request for Rule 33 
sanctions. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court and its commissioner erred 
in concluding that Utah did not have jurisdiction 
in this matter, in enforcing the Ohio change of 
custody order that had not been filed in Utah, 
and in refusing to allow Holm a hearing before 
enforcing the Ohio change of custody order. 
Furthermore, the district court erred in 
permitting Commissioner Lema to exceed her • 
authority, and Commissioner Lema erred by 
exceeding her authority and attempting to 
assume judicial power in violation of the Utah 
Constitution and Utah law. In addition, 
Smilowitz's request for sanctions is denied. This 
matter is reversed and remanded to the district 
court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
ORME, Judge (concurring specially): 
Judge Billings and I concur fully in the court's 
opinion except in one limited respect. Our 
disagreement concerns the discussion of the 
nondelegability of core judicial functions as a 
matter of constitutional law. In our view, such 
discussion would be necessary only if the 
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controlling statute and rule, by their terms, 
purported to vest commissioners with the power 
exercised by the commissioner in this case. If 
they did, it would become necessary to consider 
whether these enactments were constitutional. 
However, since the commissioner's actions were 
not even authorized by statute or rule, we see no 
need to opine about the constitutional 
implications of such actions.9 
A determination of whether this kind of 
authority could constitutionally be delegated to 
quasi-judicial officers should properly await 
some actual attempt at delegation of such 
authority. Where such delegation has not 
occurred, discussion about the constitutional 
propriety of such a scheme is dicta. Given the 
institutional proscription against reaching 
constitutional issues unnecessarily, we do not 
join in this dicta, even though it makes a good 
point for the consideration of the Legislature and 
the Judicial Council as those entities continue the 
on-going effort to delineate the proper role and 
authority of commissioners in this state's judicial 
system. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1 CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
1. Specifically, the conversation proceeded as follows: 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: (Commissioner Lema| 
just told me that we were not going to have a 
hearing. What she said — she told me — she said, 
"I will call Judge Eves and see what his opinion 
is of this." She — she then called me hack and 
said she had talked to you, and said that you had 
told her to go ahead and have the order enforced 
that night and to call the police officers — 
THE COURT: Let me disabuse you of that. She 
called me; told me that she was going to deny 
jurisdiction in the matter; that she'd already 
spoken with the judge back in Ohio; that they had 
continuingand original jurisdiction. They wanted 
? to maintain that. That under the Uniform Child 
Custody Act, she did not feel Utah could take 
jurisdiction of the matter. As she explained the 
facts to me, I concurred that we could not take 
jurisdiction. That was the extent of the 
conversation. That we had no jurisdiction in the 
matter so long as Ohio intended to continue with 
their jurisdiction, and that the matter should be 
handled in Ohio. And that was the extent of our 
conversation. 
2. Moreover, if the district court and its commissioner 
were correct in concluding that Utah did not have 
jurisdiction, then it follows that not only did Utah lack 
jurisdiction to prevent the execution of the Ohio order, 
but it also lacked jurisdiction to enforce it. 
3 . The specific language of Utah Code Ann. §78-22a-
2(2) (1992) reads: "A copy of a foreign judgment 
authenticated in accordance with an appropriate act of 
Congress or an appropriate act of Utah may be filed 
with the clerk of any district court in Utah." 
Smilowitz argues that the use of "may" suggests that 
the method undertaken here, simply taking the foreign 
judgment straight to the police, is also an acceptable 
alternative. We disagree. The Utah Supreme Court 
explained the history of the Utah Foreign Judgment 
Act in Pan Energy v. Martin, 813 F\2d 1142, 1143 
(Utah 1991), and noted that its purpose was "to 
simplify the enforcement of foreign judgments by 
sparing the judgment holder the burden of further 
litigation and allowing enforcement in this state by the 
simple expedient of filing the judgment with a county 
clerk in Utah. The judgment holder still has the 
option, however, to commence an enforcement action 
under the older, traditional approach." Id. (citation 
omitted). Thus, use of the word "may" merely 
conveys that the judgment holder may file it with a 
district court clerk or use the prior approach, not that 
he may proceed without docketing the judgment 
whatsoever. 
4. Magistrates may, however, with the consent of both 
parties perform certain judicial functions. See 28 
USCA §636(c)(l). 
5. That rule also states that commissioners may 
adjudicate default and uncontested divorces and 
uncontested modifications and issue temporary or ex 
parte orders. Whether this provision constitutes an 
unconstitutional vesting of judicial power in 
commissioners is questionable. However, the present 
case involves Commissioner Lema's dismissal of 
Holm's motion for Utah to accept jurisdiction, an 
order which served HS a final adjudication of her 
claim. Thus, since her actions clearly exceeded the 
scope of her authority, in violation of section 6-
401(6), we need not address the constitutionality of 
this provision. 
6. Commissioners could not be given by statute the 
power to make final orders, since such would he an 
unconstitutional vesting of ultimate judicial powers. 
7. Rule 6-401(B) also provides that commissioners 
shall not serve as pro tempore judges in any matter, 
except as provided by Rule of the Supreme Court. 
8. Although appellate courts "should avoid addressing 
constitutional issues unless lequired to do so," State v. 
Anderson,10\ P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1985) (footnote 
omitted), such is necessary here. Since Commissioner 
Lema's actions were clearly in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §78-3-3 l(6)(b) (Supp. 1991) and Rule 6-
401(6)(A) of the Judicial Council Rules of Judicial 
Administration, we can conclude that the 
commissioner exceeded her authority without reaching 
the constitutionality of her actions. However, we are 
nonetheless compelled to address the constitutionality 
of Judge Eves's delegation of authority to 
Commissioner Lema to engage in ultimate judicial 
decision making, by allowing her to hear, decide, and 
dismiss Holm's cause of action on August 22, 1991, 
for lack of jurisdiction. 
At a hearing held on September 4, Judge Eves 
stated that Commissioner Lema had called him on the 
night of August 22 and "told |him] that she was going 
to deny jurisdiction in the matter." Later in that same 
hearing, he said, "We had no jurisdiction in the 
matter. Vie commissioner had so determined* He 
also stated that he "simply reaffirmed Commissioner 
Lema's determination that we had no jurisdiction in 
the matter." In allowing Commissioner Lema to make 
this jurisdictional determination, Judge Eves 
impermissibly delegated ultimate judicial power to 
her. Since Judge Eves derives his authority from the 
Utah Constitution, and not from the Utah Code or the 
Rules of Judicial Administration, the constitutionality 
of such delegation must be addressed. 
9. In footnote 8 of the main opinion, it is suggested 
that the constitutional issue must be decided because 
Judge Eves made a delegation of authority to the 
commissioner and, "Judge Eves derives his authority 
from the Utah Constitution." 
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It is true that the district court is specifically 
recognized in the Utah Constitution as a repository of 
Mlt]he judicial power of the state/ Utah Const, art. 
VIII, §1. See also id. §5. But essentially all of the 
details concerning the ways and means of exercising; 
that power are established by statute and rule. While 
it is possible that the Judicial Council would have the 
power to establish commissioners by rule even without 
specific authorizing legislation, see Utah Const, art. 
VIII, §12, as matters stand, commissioners are 
authorized by statute, with authority "as provided by 
this section and rules of the Judicial Council/ Utah 
Code Ann. §78-3-3 l(l)(a) (1992). No statute or rule 
purports to vest an individual judge with the power to 
expand upon this carefully delineated authority. 
Thus, even if it is true that Judge Eves undertook to 
delegate to the commissioner "ultimate judicial 
decision makingH in this case, it is unnecessary to 
look to the constitution in deciding the validity of that 
delegation. It is enough to observe that neither the 
applicable statute nor any rule of the Judicial Council 
even arguably permits such a delegation. Such 
delegation, then, is contrary to state statute and 
contrary to Council rule. Having said so, it is simply 
unnecessary to comment on its constitutionality other 
than, perhaps, to note that the judicial power referred 
to in art. VIII, §1, does not vest an individual district 
court judge, acting with no basis in statute or rule, to 
delegate to a commissioner any authority not 
otherwise permitted by statute or rule. But this 
proposition holds true across the board and is not 
limited functions which are characterized as core 
judicial functions. 
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